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Introduction
In this chapter we draw attention to spoken and unspoken aspects of
government policy found in the disadvantaging of community forms of
gambling. Much of the rhetoric presented by government claims to be about
protecting communities from gambling, but we argue that this language is
at odds with the realities of policy and of practice. Such rhetoric
foreshadowed the recent Review of Gaming, but the outcomes to date are
not designed to redress the balance. These outcomes include a moratorium
on casino licences securing the existing monopoly, increased surveillance
on gaming machines run by clubs and pubs by the Department of Internal
Affairs, and a bizarre effort to check Internet-based gambling in New
Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 2001.
There remain two areas of discontinuity. First, government policy has
resulted in the rapid growth of gambling. The most obvious features of
this escalation include the introduction of a televised state lottery Lotto,
in 1987, the decision to license casinos 1990, the decision to allow sports
betting through the TAB 1996, and the ongoing expansion of the products
licensed to gambling businesses. Second, government policies have
disadvantaged existing community forms of gambling including housie,
clubs, pubs and rural racing clubs and have stymied new initiatives most
notably Maori-based or `iwi' gambling. In short, changes to gambling
policy and regulations have marginalised the positive aspects of gambling
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returning profits to the communities from which they originated; providing
a source of revenue for the individuals who benefit from community
gambling, for example, sports clubs while doing little to minimise the
undesirable outcomes, such as problem gambling.
What Do We Mean by Community?
community n., p1. -ties. All the people living in one district; group
having shared interests or origins; society, the public.
Collins Paperback Dictionary and Thesaurus
We all know what `community' means - we all live in a community, after
all. Most of us will identify with the first part of the definition above. We
talk about `our community' and hopefully feel a sense of belonging; public
figures such as politicians speak of actions as being `for the good of the
community'. But when we think a little further, if members of a community
have `shared interests or origins' then some of your neighbours would
probably be excluded from your community - so do the two parts of that
definition contradict each other? Do members of a community have to be
ofthe same culture? Can a person who shares your interests, origins, perhaps
is a member of your family, be part of your community although they live
in another country? People living in Remuera and people living in Otahuhu
are all members of the Auckland community - or are they?
The assumption of geographical boundaries is not unique to lay
dictionaries; `community' as `a collection of people within a geographical
area' is the skeletal definition offered by the Penguin Dictionary of
Sociology Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1988. However, Abercrombie,
Hill and Turner acknowledge that the term is elusive and vague to the
point of having lost specific meaning. They suggest a further three elements
which may also be present in the usage of the term `community': 1
collections of people with a particular social structure; 2 a sense of
belonging or community spirit; and 3 the daily activities of a particular
community, taking place within a geographical area.
Our focus is on both the locational character of community and the
process of constructing community. By this latter term we mean that
communities really exist only insofar as they are active. Such cooperative
activities - in all their varied forms and eschewing moral and legal
judgements - are the building blocks of community. Further, without such
activity there is only geography and in effect an absence of community.
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Clearly there are a number of significant implications from this
`constructivist' take on community. First, communities are considered to
be variable and unpredictable. There is an episodic element to communities
as their activities ebb and flow. Second, attempts to protect or defend
communities from the outside by funding or law or other sanctions are
somewhat problematic in that they rely on external definitions of what
constitutes proper community activity. This is very significant in the case
of gambling where so much ofthe legislation is about `authorised purposes'.
Third, and no doubt most controversially, protecting communities should
be about enabling them and the activities they pursue. The problem here of
course is where community activity is considered immoral, illegal or harmful.
This leads us to a definition of community forms of gambling.
By `community forms' is meant gambling wherein the community is
important as both a source of expenditure and as a recipient of the resulting
profits. The most important feature of any community form of gambling is
that profits are returned and recycled to the community, if not to the very
gamblers who sustained the losses in the first place. Housie games are an
exemplar of this. They are often organised by a small charity or community
organisation for example, the local animal shelter, which receives the
profits and uses them to fund its services. The housie players are often
recruited from users of the charity. Rural race tracks provide another
example: horse owners, trainers, jockeys, race sponsors and `punters' are
usually all part of the same community, so profits are largely returned to
that community through supporting local businesses.
A community form of gambling can be contrasted with the corporate
forms where gross profits are dispersed to shareholders as in the case of
the casinos or distant stakeholders as in the case of the TAB and New
Zealand Lotteries Commission, well beyond the contributing/gambling
community. It is contended that gambling at housie sessions, on gaming
machines in clubs and pubs, at rural race clubs and in iwi-based forms
constitute some genuine community forms. As such it must be noted that
this definitionis at odds with the Lotteries Commission's claim to a
`Community Benefit Model' New Zealand Lotteries Commission, l997d,
1997e. This will be discussed below.
Government Policy: The Reality of a Mixed Message
There is no single explicit gaming policy. Successive governments have
intervened in the gaming industry in response to societal changes, new
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types ofgames, industry pressure and concerns about the negative effects
of gambling ... Traditionally Government intervention in the gaming
sector reflected society's view that gambling should only be permitted if
it was intended for fundraising purposes, because it has undesirable social
consequences. However, the fact that casinos are allowed to keep their
profits is a departure from this view .... Many sectors of the gaming
industry are required to distribute their profits back to the community.
Thus the gaming sector is required to contribute to the community.
personal communication, The Treasury, 14/ 4/ 2000
The above quote from the Treasury identifies the main elements in the
Government's licensing of gambling in New Zealand and, in particular, its
connection with community. These are somewhat contradictory components
and certainly state policy in the last 15 years has been subjected to
crosscutting pressures and demands. Nevertheless, an earlier position of
the state that gambling should be strictly proscribed is no longer plausible
Austrin, 1998. This is not to say that the `neo-libecal' approach to policy
favoured elsewhere by the New Zealand state at least in the period 1984
to 1999 and still championed by the Treasury has won the day.
There has been little in the way of deregulation in gambling of the type
associated with neo-liberal policies elsewhere in New Zealand. The growth
of gambling is associated with the ad hoc addition of legislation and
regulation. This has involved the retention of the state in the business of
gambling i.e., in the sale of gambling products whereas elsewhere in the
economy the pursuit of the neo-liberal agenda has seen the corporatisation
and privatisation of `state-owned enterprises' for example, in airports,
banking, energy, forestry, housing, ports, public transport, railways,
telecommunications, etc.
The diversification of gambling has involved both incumbent state
entities and new commercial gaming operators being licensed for
business by government. The Totalisator Agency Board has diversified
into sports betting 1996 and Internet wagering 1999. The Lotteries
Commission has diversified into a televised lottery 1987, scratch-cards
Instant Kiwi, 1989, a televised version of keno Daily Keno, 1994, a
televised version of housie Telebingo, 1996, now discontinued and a game
show Risk, 2001. The new operators are the commercial enterprises
running casinos established in Christchurch 1994, Auckland 1996,
Dunedin 1999, two in Queenstown 1999 and another likely to open in
Hamilton 2002.
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The continued stakeholding by the state in gambling is understandable
in terms of two dynamics. First is the longstanding approach to gambling
where the focus has been to channel activity into charitable forms. This
reflects the stigmatised or morally dubious character of gambling. The
slightly `shady' aspects of gambling limit its promotion as a legitimate
form of entertainment business. This moral rationale underpins the laws
empowering the New Zealand Lotteries Commission and the TAB. The
second factor in state stakeholding is the problematic character of the
Lotteries Commission and the TAB as `state-owned enterprises'. Continued
stakeholding by the state reflects problems in defining and then disposing
of either the Lotteries Commission or the TAB as state assets.
Most at issue in the laws relating to gambling is the extent to which
gambling is conducted for charitable or for commercial purposes. Three
Acts coexist: the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1977, the Racing Act 1971
and the Casino Control Act 1990. The recent Review of Gaming suggests
that the 1977 Act and the 1990 Act will be merged by a proposed
Responsible Gambling Bill. The most significant feature of such a new
Act would be the elimination of the Casino Control Authority and the
broadening of Department of Internal Affair activities. The distinction
between commercial and charitable gambling would be untouched. As it
stands, the Gaming and Lotteries Act continues a long tradition of making
illegal all games of chance. One set of exceptions are those games made
legal under section 8 of the Act. This section reads:
The Minister may from time to time, at his discretion, on the application
in writing of any society, grant to that society, in respect of any game
or games of chance that would otherwise be illegal, a licence authorising
it to conduct the game or games of chance specified in the licence if he
is satisfied that the society's object in doing so will be to raise money
for an authorised purpose.
Section 2 clarifies what is an authorised purpose: `any charitable,
philanthropic, cultural, or party political purpose, or any other purpose
that is beneficial to the community or any section of it'.
A multitude of housie operators, lottery organisers and operators of
gaming machines in clubs and pubs all sites other than casinos are licensed
by the Department of Internal Affairs. Alongside this regulatory function
the Act also provides for the establishment of the Lotteries Commission.
The Commission was instituted to: `promote, organise and conduct state
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lotteries and prize competitions' Department of Internal Affairs, l995e:
79. The Lotteries Commission drafts the rules under which it sells gaming
products e.g. Keno Rules 1994 and Lotto Rules 1996. The Act also
established the Lottery Grants Board.
A share of profits from the sale of Lottery Commission products is paid
to the Lottery Grants Board. For the period 1994-98, this share amounted
to 45 per cent of gross profits approximately $630 million. The Lottery
Grants Board, in turn, operates as a charitable trust, making disbursements
to a range of dispersal committees. Around 41.5 per cent of this amount is
given to three organisations: The Hillary Commission for Sport, Fitness
and Leisure 20%; Creative New Zealand 15%; and the New Zealand
Film Commission 6.5%. The balance is distributed through 13 standing
committees.
A second set of exceptions to the strictures of the Gaming and Lotteries
Act 1977 are the activities of the Totalisator Agency Board. These are
outlined in the Racing Act 1971. The activities of the TAB are controlled
by interpretation of both Acts. The Racing Act outlines the products and
services the TAB can offer. Any change in the gambling products supplied
by the TAB requires amendment to the Racing Act Racing Industry Board
and TAB, 1995: 58-59. The Gaming and Lotteries Act makes mention of
the TAB by describing the legal activities of other gambling operators
with the exception of the casinos, including the Lotteries Commission,
housie operators, and people running lotteries, and by criminalising all
private forms of bookmaking.
The terms `charitable' or `authorised purposes' do not appear in the
Racing Act. Instead the Totalisator Agency Board is required to transfer a
fixed percentage of its gross profits fixed at 33% to the Racing Industry
Board RIB also created by the Racing Act, which in turn makes
disbursements to incorporated galloping, hunt, harness and greyhound
racing clubs. Thus the Lotteries Commission and the TAB are much alike.
Both enjoy state-licensed monopolies: the TAB in bookmaking and sports
betting; the Lotteries Commission in a range of televised and scratch-card
games. Both return a significant percentage oftheir gross profits to separate,
at ann's-length, disbursement organisations. Both exist to generate revenues
solely for this type of disbursement by the Lottery Grants Board and the
Racing Industry Board.
The Casino Control Act 1990 is an exception to the canon of gambling
law. The Act is at odds with the rest of the law on gambling as it allows the
licensing of casinos for commercial reasons.2 It can be interpreted as a
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model for the type of `neo-liberal' reform of gambling where the state
surrenders its active stakeholding in the industry. Its coexistence with the
earlier legislation sharpens the contradictory character of the state as an
operator in the business of gambling.
Putting aside the state's historical and ongoing commitment to use the
TAB to fund the racing industry and the Lotteries Commission to fund the
Lottery Grants Board, there emerge some concerns in replicating a
privatisation programme in gambling. The issue of ownership is central.
Both the TAB and Lotteries Commission are state entities in the sense
that they exist because of law. However, whether this basis of existence
makes them `assets' of the state, especially assets available for sale by the
state, is highly debatable. The Lotteries Commission is charged with
organising state lotteries. There is no operational reason preventing this
responsibility being conducted, on a subcontracting basis, by a fully
commercial business. Indeed such a business had the monopoly on the
sale of `Art Union' tickets in the l930s RIB and TAB, 1995: 46. What is
more problematic is the extent to which a monopoly license to run a state
lottery could be granted to a commercial operator in the current context.
The most important aspects ofmonopoly are access to television and retail
outlets. The evidence here is contradictory. On the one hand, the
privatisation of Telecom necessitated the ending of monopoly
arrangements. On the other hand, the privatisation of New Zealand Rail
furthered a monopoly.
A privatisation ofthe Lotteries Commission would constitute a political
rather than a legal problem. Certainly the legal ramifications of the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises did not figure in the 1984-1999
round of asset sales. However, Easton 1994, 1999 notes that the
`radicalism' of the reform process is exhausted. The Labour-Alliance
Government has promised no further asset sales. Arguably the moment for
any privatisation of the state entities in gambling has passed. This is not to
say that there are no protagonists for privatisation. Such enthusiasm is
clearly the case for the TAB. In its joint submission with the Racing Industry
Board, A New Direction for the Future: Reforming the Gaming Industry,
the claim is made that: `the Government should no longer participate as a
principal in the gaming market' 1995: 14. Furthermore, the RIB and TAB
suggest it is appropriate to `review existing legislated gaming product
markets' 1995: 14.
However, there are contesting claims to the TAB as an asset. On the
one hand it can be argued and is argued by senior officials of the TAB
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that the TAB enjoys the same status as any other product of legislation.
The TAB could be privatised in the same way as were the former ministries
of state. On the other hand, there is a strong prima facie case for the racing
clubs as sole fiduciary stakeholders in the TAB. In short there are at least
two contesting versions for privatisation.
For government, charting a path eliminating what Markland 1996: 80-
82 calls `anomalies and inconsistencies' in gambling and what the Minister
of Internal Affairs sees as being `confused and complex' Burton, 2000,
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. At the same time the current
arrangements must be regarded as insecure. While it may be feasible for
the state to continue the highly uneven practices of licensing, there are
tensions both within and outside the currently licensed field. In this respect
the proposed Responsible Gambling Bill is likely to be a very conservative
document, doing little more than securing the existing arrangements.
Ofimmediate concern to the state is the reliance ofthe TAB and Lotteries
Commission on stagnant or declining gaming products. Horse and dog
racing sold by the TAB and all the products sold by the Lotteries
Commission with the possible exception ofInstant Kiwi are experiencing
absolute, long-run declines in turnover and expenditure. For these operators
the only viable solution is product diversification. The move by the TAB
into sports betting is significant. Still more significant, the operation of
gaming machines promises a new source of revenue for the TAB, while
the Lotteries Commission seem to have been denied this option Department
of Internal Affairs, 200 lb.3
The possibilities for reallocating existing gambling products and
operators is not the only source of tension for the state. An entirely new
range of gaming products to those currently licensed in New Zealand is
now either available or is soon to be so. The most important of these
involve the networking of sites, Internet gambling and interactive TV. All
three require a reworking of state-licensed monopolies or jurisdictions.
Surprisingly, by not addressing the licensing of these new forms of
gambling, the policy emerging from the recently completed Review of
Gambling suggests that the Government would like these new options to
`go away'. However, as the Casino Control Authority rightly notes in its
submission to the Review; `Internet gambling cannot be economically or
effectively stopped' Casino Control Authority, 2001: 28. Despite this
lucid analysis, or perhaps because of it, the Casino Control Authority is
to be scrapped and its duties subsumed by the Department of Internal
Affairs.
GAMBLING WITH COMMUNITIES 113
The Marginalisation of Community Forms
The discussion of the state's role in the gambling industry has emphasised
the statutes and some of the contradictory and shortsighted aspects of
policy. It is suggested that circumstances in the industry impose
contradictory demands on the state. Among these are conflicting pressures
for: 1 the liberalisation or stigmatisation of gambling; 2 gambling for
charitable or commercial ends; and 3 the continued involvement or exit
of the state from the business of gambling. However, in one important
dimension the inconsistent elements of state policy fit together. This unity
is found in the marginalisation of community forms of gambling.
The Lotteries Commission proposes a `Community Benefit Model' for
gambling New Zealand Lotteries Commission, 1997d, 1997e. This model
is based on the preservation and extension of the licensed monopolies
enjoyed by the Lotteries Commission and its continued funding of the
Lottery Grants Board. However, the extent to which the gaming products
sold by the Lotteries Commission take money out of communities, albeit
for redistribution by the Lottery Grants Board, is not addressed.
Consequently a more accurate name for the model championed by the
Lotteries Commission might be that of a `National Benefit Model'.
Revenues that are generated locally are redistributed nationally to elite
sporting and cultural organisations. The Lotteries Commission extracts
gross profits from local communities in precisely the same way as do fully
commercial casinos. The difference between the two types of operations
rests solely in the mechanisms for redistributing revenues: in the case
of the Lotteries Commission via the Lottery Grants Board; in the case
of the casinos via dividends to shareholders. Further, both the
Lotteries Commission and the casinos are favoured in terms of how they
are licensed to sell gaming products vis a vis their smaller community based
competitors.
The advantages enjoyed by the Lotteries Commission are partly a
product of the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1977, which established the
operator and gave it powers to draft its own rules for the sale of a range of
products. The Lotteries Commission is able to draft rules which make its
games products far more attractive than those offered by `traditional'
housie operators.4 At the same time the Lotteries Commission is favoured
by its relationship with the Department of Internal Affairs, which
administers the Act most notably, section 8 and the Housie Regulations
1989.
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While it is not the intention of the policy and inspectorate units of the
department somehow to disadvantage housie operators, their strict
interpretation of the regulations have certainly functioned in this way. This
is the first version of marginalisation: housie operators have been severely
constrained by limits on prizes, limits on play no play on Sundays, limits
on the number of games per session, restrictions on the payment of
commission forcing a reliance on volunteers to run games, limits on
advertising, and an absolute freeze on any innovations in the game or in
the technologies used to play those games Australian Institute for Gambling
Research 1998: 32 1-327. A significant number ofprosecutions have been
secured by the department against various illegal housie games. Contrast
this situation with the national retail chain, television coverage, constant
innovation, huge jackpots, and the enormous advertising budget enjoyed
by the Lotteries Commission in the sale of its products. Unsurprisingly,
housie has gone into a steep decline since 1987 and the introduction of
Lotto.5
A second version of marginalisation of community forms is found in
the regulation ofgaming machines. Once again the policy and inspectorate
units of the Department of Internal Affairs have acted to constrain
community forms of gambling, in this case at pubs and clubs. The decisive
moment in the regulation of gaming machines outside ofcasinos is found
in a reworking of the licences granted under section 8 of the Gaming and
Lotteries Act. This change in licensing was undertaken in 1988, forcing
severe limitations on existing gaming-machine operators. Thus the operators
of gaming machines were required to have both a liquor licence for their
gambling sites and be incorporated societies. For publicans this meant that
the ownership of gaming machines became vested in charitable trusts
established exclusively for this purpose. These charitable trusts the three
largest operate over 6,000 machines in nearly 900 pubs are required to
pay GST and the Gaming Duty on revenues as well as ensure that 33 per
cent of gross profits are paid to duly `authorised purposes' approved by
the Department of Internal Affairs. Each publican receives a rental on
each machine the current maximum rental is about $220 per machine, per
week. Because clubs including returned servicemen's clubs,
workingmen's clubs and sports clubs are incorporated societies in their
own right they were deemed eligible to benefit from the revenues after
the deduction of tax and all other operating expenses generated by the
gaming machines on their premises. However, both clubs and pubs are
restricted in the operation of these machines. A maximum of 18 machines
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per site is enforced, but new sites are likely to be limited to nine machines.
The Responsible Gambling Bill promises, among other things, an even
stricter enforcement ofclubs and pubs. Indeed the informal usage of `casino'
to designate the presence of gaming machines in a venue is to be outlawed
Department of Internal Affairs, 200 ib. The maximum prize a jackpot
is $1,000. The gaming machines may not be advertised. Further, only
members may play machines in clubs and the revenues so generated may
not be used to subsidise food or alcohol. Contrast this situation with that
of the casinos.
Casinos have been able to operate as many machines in their premises
as they deem commercially viable. These machines offer whatever range
of prizes or jackpots is favoured by the operator. The casinos have no
restrictions on their advertising. Unsurprisingly, after the opening of the
casinos in Christchurch 1994 and Auckland 1996, the clubs and pubs
experienced about a 30 per cent drop in their gross profits. Anecdotal
evidence suggests a recovery in these revenues, although this is difficult
to ascertain because of the increased numbers of machines in clubs and
pubs. More clearly, and more importantly, one result of the advantaging of
casinos vis a vis clubs and pubs is that gaming machines in the former
generate around five times more turnover than machines sited in the latter.
The decision to allow casinos complicates issues insofar as casino-based
gambling might and probably does cannibalise the TAB and the Lotteries
Commission. However, the entry of casinos coincided with a redoubling
ofeffort on the part ofthe Lotteries Commission and Department ofInternal
Affairs against clubs and pubs. An important feature of this campaign was
prosecutions against operators for breaches of licence conditions. Possibly
a hidden agenda here is to remove gaming machines from the charitable
trusts pubs and clubs.
The manoeuvrings of the TAB and Racing Industry Board also act to
marginalise community forms, in this case rural racing clubs. This third
version of marginalisation centres on the systematic closure of rural racing
clubs Racing Industry Board, 1997: 1-3. The Racing Industry Board has
developed a four-tier categorisation of racing clubs, ranging from A to D
venues and depending upon their strategic importance to the industry. The
criteria for categorisation of clubs involves location, the size of nearby
human or horse populations; racing surface; and the proximity and value
of other venues. Over time the race meetings held at C and D venues will
be transferred to A and B venues. Venues in category D are considered to
have significance in servicing the local community, but get no preferential
funding. All rural racing clubs are categorised D and thereby face eventual
closure.
Finally, a fourth version of marginalisation can be found in the state's
refusal to countenance Maori-owned and operated or iwi-based forms of
gambling. While successive governments have interpreted the Treaty of
Waitangi to mean the allocation of various resources to Maori, this has not
included the granting of casino licences or other gambling warrants. This
lack of resourcing is despite some governmental lip service,6 considerable
interest on the part of Maori, and the very considerable success of Native
American casino gambling in generating resources for their communities
Loomis, 1998.
Conclusion
The conclusion to this chapter is that communities experience the worst of
both worlds in the current regulation of gambling. On the one hand they
suffer the negative consequences of gambling - an industry which is
expanding rapidly. Addiction and impoverishment are the most obvious
negative impacts of gambling, yet the response to these problems by the
state is decidedly piecemeal. Further, one of the most telling aspects of the
growth of gambling is that communities are largely excluded from the
decision-making process. For example, the Resource Management Act is
not applied to gambling, although a `community veto' is now promised.
On the other hand, communities receive only a minority of the profits they
generate through gambling, and those only indirectly. Profits tend to exit
communities while community control over the resources generated by
gambling is patchy. Where profits remain in communities they do so through
the increased spending power of shareholders in gambling businesses or
through the good works of various state agencies.
Overall, the forms of gambling most closely aligned with communities
- housie, machine gambling in clubs and pubs, rural racetracks and the
possibility for iwi-based gambling - are marginalised and are likely at any
moment to be dismembered by changes in state policy. Such policy shifts
are inevitably presented as being for the good of communities but act to
disempower communities. We suggest that if govemment policy were truly
about the protection of communities then a good first step would be to
empower the forms of gambling most closely aligned with them. Easing
restrictions on housie operators, clubs and rural racetracks, and allowing
iwi-based gambling, would not cause a plague of gambling - the plague is
already with us. Sanctioning community forms of gambling would merely
ensure that `the locals' get a fair share of the gambling pie. Of course the
losers in such a scenario would be those currently most favoured, the big
players in gambling: the Lotteries Commission, TAB and the casinos. Given
this alignment of vested interests, it is a safe bet that community forms of
gambling will remain marginalised.
Endnotes:
An extremely useful website, the Gaming Review Homepage, is currently
maintained by the Department of Internal Affairs. Those with access to the
Internet should visit: http://www.dia,govt.nz/DlAwebsite.nsf/URL/
GamingReview-GamingReviewHomepage.
2 The Lotteries Commission noted in its document Responsible Gaming: A
Commentary: `the introduction of casinos for private gain was a major
aberration in the general pattern of the New Zealand gambling and gaming
industry. It should remain as an aberration ... the contagion should not be
allowed to spread' New Zealand Lotteries Commission, 1997f: 15.
In 2000 the TAB was allowed to place gaming machines in some of its
agencies. The Review of Gaming suggests that the TAB will be able to place
gaming machines in all its agencies and in racing clubs. In contrast, the
Lotteries Commission which had lobbied hard for gaming machines has been
denied such product diversification.
In its submission to the Review of Gambling a precursor to the Review of
Gaming, Bingo World a manufacturer of housie products described the
organisers ofhousie games as being: Sports Clubs, 29%; Ethnic Organisations,
25%; Service Clubs, 20%; Senior Citizen Clubs, 11%; Schools, 8%; Sundry
7% Department of Internal Affairs, 1990: 35.
Approximately 1,500 licences were issued by the Department of Internal
Affairs for housie games in 1986 and about 700 in 1995 Australian Institute
for Gambling Research, 1998: 323.
The Treaty of Waitangi is mentioned only once by the Department of Internal
Affairs, albeit on page one of its 1996 discussion document: `... any proposed
policy must comply with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi' 1996: 1
